



Grid access model for regional electric markets revisited

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
Bucuresti
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Unpredictable power flows limits of interconnectors

- “ Variable intensity and direction of power flows
- “ TSOs are often solving internal bottlenecks by moving congestion to the country border

Capacity limits and line - flows of Bulgaria-to-Romania Interconnection





Commitments in S-E Europe under “Energy Community” Treaty

- “ In 2005, regional TSOs decided to implement explicit Co-ordinated Auctioning (CA)
- “ **CA Office (CAO)** would organize yearly, monthly and daily auctions, and administrate procedure of compensation payment
- “ Assistance by Consentec and APCS consultants
- “ Support by Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB), EC, USAID, WB and BERD.



Dry-runs of Co-ordinated Auctioning

“ Since 2006, Dry-run of CA was yearly performed with participation of RO, RS, ME, MK, BG, GR, AL, BiH, HR; the model includes also HU, SL, UA, AT

“ 1st auction approach: **Total Border Capacity** as maximum flow: **vulnerable to exchange scenarios**

“ 2nd auction approach: **Net Maximum Flow** (critical outages associated to each critical branch):
vulnerable to topology, transactions and national constraints.



Overlasting Dry-runs of CA


“ After 5 years, the Dry - runs are not finalized while the CAO is not operational

“ Allocating assets owned by different countries/companies and revenue sharing are sensitive issues.

Regional power transmission capabilities

Commercial capacity (a market design issue):
transfer capability at grid connection point
(% Driving . Point+)

Operational capacity
(a PS security issue):
transfer limits of grid
critical paths
(% Point . to . Point+).





Market design: the “nodal” model

- “ Transactions, prices, and transmission capacity (TC) as well
- “ **Congestions** defined as (node) transactions changes for releasing the grid **constraints**
- “ TSO reimburses its customers for the TC non-compliance based on G and L nodal transmission rates.



II. **PS operational security**: the “source - to - sink” power transfer capability

- “ Management of network constraints is TSO’s operational issue only
- “ TSO prepares the PS Schedule and ensures the PS dispatch while sharing data with regional TSOs
- “ Clearing grid bottlenecks with resources from the Balancing Markets.



Instead of CAO, a new institutional approach for the regional coordination

CM and Monitoring Office (CMMO) assisting:

- “ TSOs to coordinate PS scheduling to maximise use of the network
- “ TSOs to take remedial actions when constraints involving several TSOs are detected
- “ Regulators to gather monitoring data and interpret market signals that indicate market manipulation.



Capacity allocation: explicit versus implicit

“ Separate trade of grid capacity and energy through **explicit** auctions is difficult and would result in an inefficient utilisation of interconnectors (ETSO/EuroPEX Report, 2008)

“ Repealing Directive 2003 / 54 / EC and new Regulation (EC) No 1228 / 2003:

“TSOs shall pay due attention to the merits of **implicit** auctions for short . term allocations” +



Conclusions

- “ New approaches of regional grid capability and coordination are necessary; market players should understand the capacity calculation process
- “ Nodal+pricing and transmission capacity would be salutary market design paradigms
- “ To limit capacity pancaking, with congestions moved to the borders, TSOs only should be involved in the operation of interconnectors, including clearing of interconnectors constraints.



Thank you very much for attention!

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